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Section 1: The Problem with Mercantilism  
 
It has become common to note the failure of neoclassical economics to explain 
economic divergence between countries and regions. In recent years this has 
frequently been attributed to some countries developing or capturing industries with 
increasing returns; i.e. that the agglomeration effects typical of increasing returns 
industries are sensitive to slight differences in initial conditions that over time lead to 
further agglomeration and thus increasing divergence rather than convergence 
between regions and countries (Romer 1986, Krugman and Venables 1995, Fujita and 
Thisse 2002).
1
 
Just as the lack of short-term convergence among modern economies can be 
attributed to the capturing of increasing returns-to-scale activities, many believe 
Europe (and its settler colonies) did this on a long-term, global scale as well, in a 
global division of labor at the state and regional level. In the economic history 
literature this process is sometimes explained in other language, i.e., that Europe 
deindustrialized its colonies e.g., in dependency theory in general, and works such as 
Amin 1976, Forbes and Rimmer 1984, and Alam 2000. This long-term, increasing 
                                                 
1
 ‘In technical papers written between 1983 and 1986, Krugman observed that the received wisdom 
about free trade was substantially wrong…“Instead, trade seems to reflect arbitrary or temporary 
advantages resulting from economies of scale or shifting leads in close technological races." In some 
cases, Krugman added, comparative advantage can be created. By strategically intervening to capture 
advantage in industries with technological dynamism, nations could produce spillover benefits for their 
economies….This revisionism was explosive. It came to be known as the "new view" of trade.’  
(Kuttner 1996, para. 7-8). 
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returns perspective is interesting because it can be seen as (regarding reasons 
proposed for the ‘great divergence’ in levels of development that economic historians 
now tell us happened mainly in the last few centuries
2
) merging or at least compatible 
with both many recent mainstream economic observations related to regional 
economics, agglomeration, and increasing returns-to-scale activities (‘new’ trade 
theory) and aspects of important heterodox arguments (Marxist/dependency theories, 
some Austrian economics, and much evolutionary economics - related to competition, 
for example). 
How, then, did European states rise in the international division of labor? A 
frequent answer is that European expansion - ‘trading-post’, colonial, and imperial 
expansion
3
 - was a crucial cause for many reasons including through windfall effects 
on Europe’s place in world trade (emphasized, for example, by Blaut 1993 and Frank 
1998), its effects on avoiding material limits to European growth (e.g., Pomeranz 
2000) and its influence on European institutional development (e.g., Acemoglu et. al. 
2005).    
 
The State System and Mercantilist Policies 
This answer, though, only serves to raise another question: Why, then, was Europe 
so aggressive at and successful in expansion? Perhaps one of the most commonly 
shared answers, besides the global exchange of diseases favorable to Eurasians, 
especially in the Americas,
4
 is that the European state system and the competition that 
                                                 
2
 It is now generally accepted that much of the divergence between Europe and other advanced 
economies occurred since the industrial revolution, with Europe no more or even less developed than 
much of Asia prior to the industrial revolution. This suggests that the divergence is less due to  
‘internal’ or basic sociocultural differences between world regions but rather to more recent processes 
inherent in worldwide industrialization. However, arguments have been made that the industrial 
revolution itself is due to earlier, more innate differences between Europe and other regions; Jones 
1981 and 1988, among others, use the language of ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ views of European 
development.  
3
 See Curtin 1989 and 2000 for the important yet often ignored distinctions between stages and types of 
European expansion. 
4
 And - often overlooked - especially unfavorable in Africa, greatly changing both the nature and the 
timing of African/European interaction compared to other regions (Curtin 1989). 
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it fostered both caused the competitive and therefore aggressive expansion and 
increased the chances it would be successful, as earlier state competition had 
increased the technological, military, and bureaucratic capability of European states 
vis-à-vis non-European states. Indeed, of all of the factors viewed as important to 
European development, Europe’s state system is probably the most widely agreed 
upon factor: In a recent comprehensive review of the role of the state in ‘the rise of 
the West’ P.H.H. Vries notes ‘There is hardly a text on the rise of the West in which 
reference to [the European state system] and its positive effects is not made’ (2002, 
68) and goes on to list a wide range of scholars from many political orientations: 
Arrighi (1994), Baechler (1995), Baechler and Mann (1988), Braudel (1979), 
Cosandey (1997), Crone (1989), Gellner (1988), Goldstone (1991), Hall (1985), 
Huang (1999), Jones (1981), Landes (1998), Mann (1986a and 1986b), McNeill 
(1982), Pomeranz (2000), Powelson (1994), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), 
Sanderson (1995), Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989), Weiss and Hobson (1995), and 
Wright (2000).  
Even scholars critical of arguments that seem to privilege the West or capitalism 
emphasize the importance of the state system in Europe’s unique development 
trajectory. For example, Anthony Giddens writes that ‘However much one might 
distrust the nature of the contrast drawn between Europe and the “despotic” East by 
Montesquieu and his contemporaries, there is no question that the character of 
Europe, as a series of socio-political formations, differed over the long term from the 
imperial societies of Meso-America, the Near and Far East. During the sixteen 
hundred years or so which succeeded the disintegration of “its” empire, Rome, Europe 
did not experience the rise of another imperial society in its midst…Europe was a 
“state system” for the whole of this period’ (Giddens 1981, 183). The fact that these 
scholars disagree on so many other points related to development yet are in basic 
agreement concerning the centrality of the European state system to Europe’s unique 
development trajectory suggests that there is indeed something important about this 
factor. 
All of the above authors argue in part or entirely that: 
• The military technology and capacity of European states (particularly vis-
à-vis non-European regions) was enhanced through war or the threat of 
war. This would become highly relevant once colonization became a 
competition between European states.  
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• The bureaucratic capacity of European states was enhanced through war or 
the threat of war.  
• Political competition led to economic and territorial competition, 
exploration, and expansionist policies. 
• State competition (and a large number of states and high degree of trade) 
increased the chances that early trading-post and colonial (and later 
imperial) expansion world occur in the first place. 
 
The competitive policies towards technological development, trade and 
acquisition of raw materials for manufacturing were sometimes ill-defined and erratic, 
but nevertheless the very real policy among European states starting as early as the 
1500s and lasting for centuries (Reinert 1994, 1995, 1998). These policies can broadly 
be described as (or said to define) mercantilism (and colbertism and cameralism in the 
French and German traditions, which would also strongly influence Japan, the US, 
and other nations); as Schmoller describes the mercantilist system: ‘The essence of 
the system lies not in some doctrine of money, or of the balance of trade; not in tariff 
barriers, protective duties, or navigation laws; but in something far greater: - namely 
in the total transformation of society and its organizations, as well as of the state and 
its institutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial economy by that of the 
national state’ (Schmoller 1896 from Reinert 2004, 10). 
 
Mercantilism – Rejected by both the Left and the Right 
 
 5 
Mercantilism has received very little attention in the twentieth century,
5
 and much 
of the attention it has received has often used mercantilism as a straw-man against 
which to present other theories in a good light, with numerous misrepresentations 
often intentionally introduced. This has led to widespread acceptance of simplistic and 
erroneous views of mercantilism which in turn still further decreases attention to the 
subject. Paul Rich states that ‘There are few better examples of trying to lend 
misleading coherence to complex matters than the way in which mercantilism has 
been dismissed as a spent philosophy’ (Rich 2006, 183).
6
 
Mercantilism seems to have been ignored and even disparaged by both the right 
and the left, accounting for the scant attention paid to the historical impact of these 
                                                 
5 Mokyr, for example, in discussing Heckscher’s (1931) extensive treatment of mercantilism, observes 
‘the book seems to have been strangely neglected by economic historians in recent decades. 
Mercantilism as a major topic in the institutional development of Europe has not yet been taken up by 
the New Institutional Economics.’ (Mokyr 2003, 1). In a footnote Mokyr notes: ‘Of the forty five 
references to Heckscher’s work on Mercantilism in the two leading Economic History journals, thirty 
five were made before 1971, and only four since 1980. Of the thirteen citations in the entire economics 
and history sections of JSTOR to Heckscher’s work on Mercantilism, only five papers qualify as 
economic history proper. A recent well-reviewed book (Epstein, 2000), clearly concerned with similar 
issues, does not even refer to it. (Mokyr 2003, 1). McCusker writes ‘Indeed, by mid-century, some 
were prepared to deny that mercantilism as an economic doctrine had ever existed’ (McCusker 2000, 
para. 1) and that after World War II ‘mercantilism was irrelevant. After the demise of the world of 
nation states, it seemed to some best forgotten and, with it, the doctrine that had served to underpin its 
foundation. By the middle of the twentieth century more than one writer on the early modern period of 
Western European history was prepared to deny mercantilism's very existence. … The most extreme of 
these writers, D. C. Coleman (1980, p. 791), classed mercantilism with other "non-existent entities."’. 
(McCusker 2000, para. 10). 
More generally, if all of the JSTOR articles from history, political science, and economics from the 
entire twentieth century and to the present with any of the words ‘mercantilism’, ‘colbertism’, or 
‘cameralism’ in the title are considered, there are only 46 articles, of which only 12 have been 
published after 1980 (the date of Coleman’s ‘Mercantilism Revisited’), and these are mostly either 
narrowly focused responses to Ekelund and Tollison’s (1982) public choice interpretation of 
mercantilism or discussions of modern trade theory as ‘neo mercantilism’.  
6
 McCusker, for example, in discussing one of the few modern widely read discussions of mercantilism 
notes: ‘Unfortunately in their exploration of the subject Ekelund and Tollison offer little more than 
"poor history," "circular arguments," and a disinterest "in what the mercantilist writer actually wrote," 
according to Magnusson (p. 50), an evaluation with which I can only agree, sadly’ (McCusker, note 8). 
 6 
policies in the twentieth century. The left, while embracing the state’s role in 
development, rejects the capitalist and ‘internalist’ (and often, viewed as triumphalist) 
view of Europe as a region developing economically largely due to internal 
institutional development stimulated by its own internal dynamics of intra-state 
competition and commerce.
7
 Conversely, the right, while embracing the emphasis of 
mercantilism on a ‘fragmented and thus competitive’ internalist model of European 
expansion, cannot embrace mercantilism because of its emphasis on the role of the 
state in development. Thus mercantilism has found little support or attention in the 
twentieth century from any side.
8
   
                                                 
7
 Even in its ‘neo’ form mercantilism is criticized for its association with capitalism from the left. 
Lovering 1999 sees ‘new-regionalism’ as a form of neo-mercantilism and criticizes it accordingly as 
‘instrumentalist’ ‘Hayekian rhetoric’. Simply (mis)applying the word to a description of policy 
automatically paints the policy in a bad light; e.g. ‘[Texas Governor] Perry’s economic vision is the 
kind of race-to-the-bottom mercantilism we’ve come to expect from developing nations in the 
globalized economy…’ (Meyerson 2011. The term is misapplied because capturing particular sectors 
of increasing returns industry and thus raising the wealth of a region or state was traditionally the goal 
of mercantilist policies, not reducing living standards to indiscriminately attract sectors that enrich a 
minority capitalist class).   
8
 McCusker makes a similar argument in discussing the reception of Heckscher’s (1931) book on 
mercantilism:  ‘The book and its subject had less play in the second half of the twentieth century when 
the worries of the world shifted from a fear of totalitarianism of the right to a fear of totalitarianism of 
the left. Indeed, by mid-century, some were prepared to deny that mercantilism as an economic 
doctrine had ever existed’ (McCusker 2000, para. 1) 
and 
As World War II came and passed, many thought they saw the future in an even newer and 
now victorious doctrine, socialism. For them Heckscher was even less relevant - or, better 
put, mercantilism was irrelevant. After the demise of the world of nation states, it seemed to 
some best forgotten and, with it, the doctrine that had served to underpin its foundation. By 
the middle of the twentieth century more than one writer on the early modern period of 
Western European history was prepared to deny mercantilism's very existence. … The most 
extreme of these writers, D. C. Coleman (1980, p. 791), classed mercantilism with other 
"non-existent entities." It was an invention, conjured up "to prevent the study of history from 
falling into the abyss of antiquarianism" (7). With hated capitalism under attack from the 
bastions of academe, mercantilism suffered the even worse fate of being ignored. (McCusker 
2000, para. 10).  
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Consequently, there are a number of widespread misunderstandings concerning 
mercantilist policies. One is that mercantilism is simply a naïve focus on the balance 
of trade (or worse still, as an even more simplistic focus on the stock of precious 
metals, properly called ‘bullionism’). The mercantilist approach to trade and 
development was in practice much more nuanced, based on views on ‘good’ trade and 
‘bad’ trade. Good trade is trade that increases the amount of increasing returns 
activities (in that time especially, essentially manufacturing) within a country’s 
borders; bad trade is trade that increases a reliance on raw materials exports (see 
Reinert 1998). Crucially, much confusion also arises because of the difference in the 
significance of arguments concerning trade originating in the context of the country 
by far more industrialized (Great Britain, and later, also the US) and the significance 
of those arguments for everyone else: In the real world, the implications of ‘free’ 
trade turned out to be very different for the world leaders in industrial production than 
for less industrialized nations. It has seldom been grasped how fundamentally this 
influenced the interpretation of economic theory in different countries, especially in 
the English speaking countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Reinert 1998). 
 
Mercantilism and the Zero Sum game fallacy 
 
Another misunderstanding concerning mercantilist policies is that they are 
frequently portrayed as attempting to capture trade and industry due to a naïve belief 
that these are a ‘zero sum game’ when in reality trade and industrial growth are very 
much a non-zero sum game, with cooperative free trade increasing the total amount of 
goods for all. Mercantilists are portrayed, in effect, as believing (in their ignorance of 
the non-zero sum nature of development) that if considering two countries starting on 
equal terms, taking one country’s ten percent meant the winner would have sixty 
percent and the loser be left with forty percent of the pre-existing trade or industry 
levels, and ignorant of the possibility that with increased trade there may be 500 
percent more goods and industry in the future for all to share.  
However, in a non-zero sum world strongly marked by agglomerative forces 
(whatever these may be), mercantilist strategies make more, not less sense than non-
competitive policies: that is, taking a rival’s ten percent now might leave the ‘winner’ 
with the lion’s share of the 500 percent more trade/industry in the future, and the loser 
with almost none, a more likely outcome in the real world of agglomeration than each 
 8 
ending up with greater equal amounts of growth. Crucially, in a non-zero sum world 
of increasing returns and agglomeration, mercantilist strategies were especially astute 
and beneficial, although only, of course, for the ‘winners’. 
 
Based on these observations this work might be described as a ‘geography of 
mercantilism’ that seeks to understand how mercantilist policies, so intricately 
associated with both the military and commercial expansion of Europe that 
subsequently shaped global patterns of development, became spatially ‘centered’, as 
writers such as Blaut and A.G. Frank often characterize the process, on Europe. 
 
Section 2: An Empirical View of the Spaces of Mercantilism  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There seem to be at least three factors that are necessary for mercantilist policies 
to develop in a world region: 1) There must be a high amount of trade 2) there must 
be a sufficient number of states to stimulate competition among them 3) they must be 
sufficiently centralized, bureaucratically effective states. Without (1) there would be 
little to gain from mercantilist policies, without (2) there would be little motivation to 
be competitive and no competitors from which to gain, and without (3) there would be 
no way to effectively implement competitive policies. 
Although aspects of these relations have been discussed many times, there is now 
more and better spatial data that allows for these questions to be considered 
empirically more fully, and in particular, the spatial distributions of these social 
processes to be explained better than in the past, taking out the circularity inherent in 
aspatial discussions of development (Ballinger 2008e). 
 
Part II of this paper uses empirical data to better understand the global distribution 
of mercantilist policies. 
First we examine modern data that shows that in the modern economy there is a 
close connection between economic development and the types of economies 
mercantilists believed to be conducive to economic growth.  
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We then consider the three factors listed above. Instead of anecdotal stories, we 
search for data on that shows the relative potentials of different parts of the world to 
have high levels of trade, a large number of states, and the bureaucratically effective 
states.  
Why world regions? First, mercantilism ony makes sense within a group of 
polities. Second, disparities in economic development are most pronounced at the 
world regional level, with greater variation between world regions than within them. 
(Ballinger, 2011x).  
2.2 Modern Economies and Mercantilism 
Before exploring the historical relationship between increasing returns industry 
and development, it is useful to measure the modern relationship of the ratio of 
increasing returns production (manufacturing) and decreasing returns production 
(primarily agriculture; see Reinert 1996) and measures of development such as gross 
national income.  
This can be done using the schema for classifying the development levels of 
countries developed by Hoeschele (2002). Rather than judging development on a one 
dimensional measure such as GDP, it is useful to use several dimensions reflecting 
important aspects of an economy. Measuring the balance between increasing returns 
sectors and decreasing returns sectors is one method that gives a clearer indication of 
types of economies, beyond just their wealth. 
Using data on manufacturing sectors from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (the Standard International Trade Classification or 
SITC) Hoeschele develops a measure of core industrialized manufactures (CIM - 
textiles, metals manufactures, chemicals, paper and paper products) and natural 
resource intensive agricultural and mining products (NRI - basic metals, foods, 
beverages tobacco, wood and wood products). Using data from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Hoeschele develops a measure of the non-
agricultural population of countries. Countries are plotted against each other using 
these measures, and Hoeschele then divides them into six categories.
9
 These are  
                                                 
9
 Hoeschele’s original division is modified here to approximate a lognormal distribution and equalize 
the number of observations in each category. Interestingly, this division shows the data to closely 
match the world regional divisions discussed in Ballinger 2008g.  
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IC   (Industrialized, Core industrial manufactures exporting) 
IN   (Industrialized, Natural resource intensive exporting) 
PIC  (Partially Industrialized, Core industrial manufactures exporting) 
PIN   (Partially Industrialized, Natural resource intensive exporting) 
LIC  (Least Industrialized, Core industrial manufactures exporting) 
LIN   (Least Industrialized, Natural resource intensive exporting)  
In Figure 1 the x-axis measures the percentage of non-agricultural population in a 
country, while the y-axis measures the percentage of industrial exports.
10
 
 
                                                 
10
 The extreme outlier ‘np’ is Nepal; its unique position is due to the dominance of its small economy 
by textile exports (98%). Pakistan (pk), Bhutan (bt), and Bangladesh (bd) have similar economies, 
although less extremely focused on a single industry.  
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Percent Non-Agricultural Population 
Figure 1  Hoeschele’s Alternative Classification of Economies  
Source: Adapted from Hoeschele 2002 
 
  Abbreviations (Internet domain names of countries) 
 
al Albania 
ar Argentina  
at Austria  
au Australia  
bd Bangladesh  
be Belgium  
bh Bahrain  
bo Bolivia  
br Brazil  
bt Bhutan  
bz Belize  
ca Canada  
cf Central African 
Republic 
cg Congo  
ch Switzerland  
cI Chile  
cm Cameroon  
cn China  
co Colombia  
cr Costa Rica  
cy Cyprus  
cz Czech Republic  
de Germany  
dk Denmark  
dz Algeria  
ec Ecuador  
ee Estonia  
 
Eg Egypt  
es Spain  
et Ethiopia  
fi Finland  
fr France  
ft Trinidad and 
Tobago 
ga Gabon  
gl Greenland  
gr Greece  
gt Guatemala  
hk Hong Kong  
hn Honduras  
hr Croatia  
hu Hungary  
id Indonesia  
ie Ireland  
il Israel  
in India  
is Iceland  
it Italy  
It Lithuania  
jm Jamaica  
jo Jordan  
jp Japan  
ke Kenya  
kg Kyrgyzstan  
 
kr South Korea  
kw Kuwait 
lk Sri Lanka  
lv Latvia  
ly Libya  
ma Morocco  
md Moldova  
mg Madagascar  
mm Myanmar  
mn Mongolia  
mw Malawi  
mx Mexico  
my Malaysia  
mz Mozambique  
nI Netherlands  
ni Nicaragua  
no Norway  
np Nepal  
nz New Zealand  
om Oman  
pa Panama  
pe Peru  
pg Papua New Guinea  
ph Philippines  
pk Pakistan  
pl Poland  
pt Portugal  
 
py Paraguay  
qa Qatar  
ro Romania  
ru Russia  
sa Saudi Arabia 
sd Sudan  
se Sweden  
sg Singapore 
si Slovenia  
sk Slovakia  
sn Senegal  
sr Suriname  
sv El Salvador  
sy Syria  
tg Togo  
th Thailand  
tn Tunisia 
tr Turkey  
uk United Kingdom  
us United States 
uy Uruguay  
ye Venezuela 
ye Yemen 
yu Yugoslavia 
za South Africa 
zm Zambia 
zw Zimbabwe  
 
Percent  
Manu-
facturing 
Exports 
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The Hoeschele classification of economies can be used to judge the relationship 
between urbanization/industrial exports and material well-being. Table 1 (next page) 
is divided into six columns representing the six divisions in Hoeschele’s measure. The 
shaded columns represent the three upper categories in Figure 1 (IC, PIC, LIC). The 
white columns represent the three bottom categories (IN, PIN, LIN). The columns are 
divided into five rows representing low, medium-low, medium, medium-high and 
high measures of Gross National Income (World Bank 2002). 
This table allows for the comparison of countries based on both their level of 
development and their types of economies. The primary importance of this data is that 
it suggests that in the modern economy, having both a more urbanized economy and 
more industrial exports is especially associated with greater wealth, although each in 
somewhat different ways. (Compare the LIN and IC nations, and the IN and LIC 
nations – Ethiopisa and Papua New Guinea against Japan and France. The first are 
agsiciltural and export very little, the latter export a great deal and are highly 
urbanized. China, Bangladesh, Pakistan against Australia, New Zealand, and the oil 
exporting countries. The first export, percentagewise, a great deal but remain highly 
rural; the latter export a great deal and are highly urbanized.  
A country can still be highly rural yet have a high percentage of exports; it will be 
significantly more wealthy than comparable non- exporters (compare China and 
Pakistan to Ethiopia and Papua New Guinea). Like a country can be highly urbanized 
yet export a relatively small (New Zealand, Australia, Iceland) it will be often be 
significantly more wealthy than comparable percentage exports but non-urbanized 
Senegal, Bhutan. 
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Table 1  Gross National Income and the Hoeschele Classification  
(next page) 
Source: Data from Hoeschele 2003; GNI data are from the World Bank, 2002 
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Towards a Geography of Mercantilism 
Critically, the relationship demonstrated in Table 1 seems to hold historically as 
well. Economic growth is closely associated with mercantilist policies in 
industrialized countries over a period of centuries (Bairoch 1993; Reinert 1994, 1996; 
see also Williamson 2002. Similar arguments are found in Jacobs 1984 especially on 
the misunderstandings of the rejection of import substitution; Masters 1988 shows the 
results of European mercantilist policies historically against an area of free trade in 
the Ottoman Empire; there are, of course vast and closely related literatures on the 
usefulness of import replacing and protectionism, globalization, and free trade). 
Economic historian Paul Bairoch states ‘It is difficult to find another case where the 
facts so contradict a dominant theory than the one concerning the negative impact of 
protectionism; at least as far as nineteenth-century world economic history is 
concerned. In all cases protectionism led to, or at least was concomitant with, 
industrialization and economic development. Also, in the four examples of liberalism, 
three had negative or very negative consequences.’ (Bairoch 1993, 54). 
 
The question I will seek to address empirically is: If economic growth is 
associated with mercantilist policies historically, and the concentration within a 
state’s borders of increasing returns industries both historically and in modern data, 
what has caused the spatial distribution of mercantilist policies? This is important 
because it seems that the historical spatial distribution of mercantilist policies 
underlies the modern distribution of development.  
 
2.3 Condition One: Number of States  
As noted in the introduction to Part Two, the three conditions for a mercantilist 
system to develop are a large number of states in close interaction, and sufficiently 
centralized, a large amount of trade, and bureaucratically effective states. Without the 
first condition there is no one from which to gain anything. Without the second there 
is not enough to be gained. And without he third there is no way to implement 
mercantilist polices.  
There are of course many factors that can conceivably influence the number of 
states in a region. Some regions are dominated by single large empires for long 
 16 
periods of time, others by many smaller competing polities, and others are essentially 
stateless for long periods and over large areas. Different world regions differ radically 
on the number of states with perhaps two of the strongest factors influencing this 
number being the antiquity of state development and the degree to which large 
empires formed. We will consider the historical-political considerations below. 
However, besides the real world historical considerations, ceteris paribus, another 
important factor is simply size – the larger the area the greater the possibility for more 
nations. This is especially true given the fact that there were strong limitations on 
effective state-sizes due to transport and communication limits in pre-industrial times.  
Ignoring for the moment other historically contingent factors, which world regions 
were the largest?  
Definition of ecumene 
then 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4   Suitability for Rain Fed Crops Excluding Forest Ecosystems
11
  
                                                 
11 This includes maize, a non-Eurasian crop; however, (with inspection of related GAEZ data) it is 
representative of the relative fertility of the regions concerning the main crops, wheat, barley and rye in 
Europe, and rice and millet in China; if anything, China and India are overrepresented with the addition 
of maize as they are better suited to maize production than Europe (even including the Mediterranean; 
see the appropriate GAEZ plates on the IIASA website). 
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Source: Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
Number of competing world regions  - South America, North America, Sub-
Saharan Africa, western Eurasia (‘Europe’ and the Mediterranean litteoral east to 
destersts of central Eurasia), South and East Asia, and to some degree Australasia.  
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other Eurasian ecumene.  
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Figure 5   Eurasia - Suitability for Rain Fed Crops Excluding Forest Ecosystems 
Source: Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Transport Costs and Regional Trade Potential 
 
One of the key factors shaping the historical distribution of world-regional trade is 
transport costs. Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (1999) and Rappaport and Sachs (2001) 
collect data that shows the close historical and modern association of low transport 
costs with high levels of trade and industrial agglomeration. Some of their data is 
easily visualized and shows the close relationship between transport costs and spatial 
patterns of high trade and economic development. For instance, Mellinger, Sachs, and 
Gallup map data on the transport capacity of world rivers. Taking coasts and ocean 
navigable rivers and highlighting the areas within easy land-transport range (100 
kilometers) of these provides a good picture of the relative transport cost potentials of 
world regions. This transport-cost data can then be usefully compared to other 
extensive data, such as global GDP density. 
In recent decades detailed and accurate maps of the density of global economic 
production have been developed (a reflection of both the population density and 
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economic productivity of a region). Comparing transport-cost data and GDP density 
measurements reveals the long-term influence of transport-cost potentials on 
cumulative levels of population and economic activity (spurious correlation or reverse 
causation are ruled out by the many detailed historical accounts of the mechanisms 
linking transport costs with both population growth and economic and industrial 
location). In Figure 2 the upper section highlights in black 100 kilometers inland of 
ice free coast and on both sides of ocean navigable rivers. Directly below it is a 
modern detailed map of global GDP density. Note the close spatial correlations 
between the factors. 
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Figure 2 Global Water Transport Potential and GDP Density  
Sources: Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup 1999 
 
 The statistical methods of measuring GDP density used in Figure 2 may be inaccurate 
for a number of reasons, with two especially important limitations being 1) the 
estimated two billion people, especially in rural areas and developing countries, which 
remain outside of the formal economy and 2) that areas with high levels of economic 
activity such as commercial centers, warehouse districts, industrial zones, and airports 
have low resident population densities. A useful method for correcting these problems 
is to directly measure the spatial distribution of economic activity using measures of 
nighttime light emissions, which serve as an especially accurate spatial indicator of 
both the distribution and intensity of economic activity (Doll et al. 2000; Sutton and 
Costanza 2002). Below (Figure 3) is a photograph of global light emissions, again 
compared with a map showing the 100 kilometer zone of coasts and ocean navigable 
rivers (this time using a negative of the image for easier comparison with the light 
emissions image). 
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Figure 3  Global Light Emissions Compared with Land Within 100 Km. of 
Ocean Navigable Water 
Source: NASA (top) and Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (1999, 28) 
 
Again the close correlation between the exceptionally low transport costs 
associated with water transport and the density of economic activity are evident, 
suggesting the effects of long-term and cumulative causation of transport costs on 
population and industrial agglomeration.  
Just as there is now much more extensive, accurate, and detailed data available to 
consider older arguments on relationships between transport costs, trade and 
development (the first factor mentioned as necessary conditions for mercantilist 
policies to develop) there is likewise data that might be used to revisit arguments 
concerning the number and strength of states in world regions (the second and third 
factors mentioned as necessary for mercantilist policies to develop). Much of this data 
is also usefully visualized with descriptive statistics and maps. 
 
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 
Recent global yet detailed data, such as the Global Agro-Ecological Zones 
(GAEZ) data
12
 has been developed that shows distributions of agricultural potential. 
GAEZ measures numerous important factors with thousands of observations at 1 
                                                 
12
 The Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
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degree by 1 degree scales or smaller including critical data on daily precipitation, 
seasonal variations in precipitation, evapotranspiration rates, frost days, terrain slopes, 
soil depth, soil fertility, soil chemistry, soil drainage, and soil texture. These factors 
have been combined to precisely delineate the spatial patterns of agriculturally 
productive land for many of the world’s most important crops and crop types (grains, 
root crops, oil crops etc.). Taken together, these measurements allow for a far more 
detailed yet at the same time spatially extensive consideration of variations in world 
regional agricultural potentials. 
Although developed primarily to estimate potential world food supplies and 
mitigate famine, this data can also be used to show that there are indeed dramatic 
differences and clear patterns to world regional potentials for food production. This is 
important because some, such as Blaut (1993, 2000, who in turn is frequently cited, 
e.g. Robbins 2003) reject development arguments that are based on differences in 
agricultural productivity. Blaut selectively uses data to refute earlier arguments of this 
type; more modern, detailed and spatially extensive data clearly shows that Blaut’s 
arguments are either incorrect or misleading (i.e., there are, as Blaut claims, areas of 
productive tropical soils; this does not mitigate the fact that overall there are serious 
problems with and drawbacks to tropical agriculture). Many parts of the world clearly 
do suffer from important limitations and temporal instabilities (Davis 2002) of food 
production potential, while others have unusually high and stable capacities for food 
production.
13
 Increasingly, work such as Sachs 1997, Gallup et. al. 1999, Masters and 
McMillan 2000, Masters and Wiebe 2000, and Masters and Sachs 2001 show 
mechanisms whereby food production stability and potential (and other geographic 
factors) directly and indirectly impact social and economic development outcomes, 
                                                 
13
  Based on modern soil, terrain and climate data the GAEZ researchers note ‘that more than three-
quarters of the global land surface (excluding Antarctica)… suffer rather severe constraints for rain-fed 
cultivation. Some 13 percent is too cold, 27 percent is too dry, 12 percent is too steep, and about 65 
percent are constrained by unfavorable soil conditions (percentages do not sum up to 100, because 
different constraints coincide in some locations). The analysis concludes that only 3.5 percent of the 
land surface can be regarded to be entirely free of constraining factors. Only for some sub-regions in 
Europe did the share of essentially constraint-free conditions reach 20 percent and more.’ 
Similarly, Davis (2002) finds that Europe is virtually the only part of the world not seriously negatively 
affected by the ENSO oscillation variations in weather so strongly detrimental to stable agricultural 
production, especially in Africa and Asia. 
 24 
through affecting average lifespan (and thus also investment in education), the 
accumulation through early agricultural productivity of the minimal capital necessary 
for improvements in infrastructure, education, and health initiatives, the lack of 
agricultural surpluses for trade, which has knock-on consequences on the 
development of policy choices and institutional development (such as banks and legal 
institutions) and so on. In addition to these arguments, recent extensive yet detailed 
agricultural data may be relevant to state competition and the second factor – a large 
number of states – necessary for mercantilist policies.  
 
 
THREE – CENTRALIZATION OF STATES 
 
The last statement above alludes not just to the number of states, but to the 
strength and centralization of states. But can this factor also be better considered 
empirically now than in the past?  
 
The third factor important for a geography of mercantilism is the distribution of 
strong, centralized, bureaucratically effective states. To some degree the third 
condition is a result of the first two; there are arguments that trade stimulated the rise 
of and improved the quality or efficiency of institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995; 
Acemoglu et. al. 2005; this connection is often thought to occur in close conjunction 
with urbanization, e.g., Fox 1971, 1989, 1991; Jacobs 1969, 1984). There are also 
arguments that many, closely interacting states and the resulting interstate competition 
increased bureaucratic centralization and effectiveness, especially via military 
competition increasing bureaucratization (e.g., taxes levied to support the military, 
centralization of powers to enforce taxation, censuses in order to gauge war-making 
capacity - see especially Tilly 1990, as well as Spruyt 1994 and the long list of 
examples from de Vries 2002 above). These interrelated aspects of regional state and 
institutional development then become self-reinforcing in Myrdal-type cumulative 
causation: States with strong or effective institutions in turn were able to trade more 
and compete more effectively, further improving their institutions and so on.  
 
It was shown in Figure 4 that there are a number of world regions with extensive 
areas of productive agriculture, and noted that these areas are associated with early 
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state development and with varying subsequent degrees of political fragmentation. 
Were these systems not just of many, but of strong competing states? It may be 
possible to use a measure of the long-term historical strength of states developed to 
test the relationship between state antiquity and economic growth in Bockstette, 
Chanda, and Putterman (2002).
14
  
Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002) divide the period from 1 to 1950 C.E. 
into 39 half centuries. They rank each half century based on three questions:  
1. Is there a government above the tribal level? (1 point if yes, 0 points if no)  
2. Is this government foreign or locally based? (1 point if locally based, 0.5 points 
if foreign (i.e., the country is a colony), 0.75 if in between (a local government with 
substantial foreign oversight)  
3. How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this 
government? (1 point if over 50%, 0.75 points if between 25% and 50%, 0.5 points if 
between 10% and 25%, 0.3 points if less than 10%). 
 
COMBINING THE FACTORS  - TOTAL PROPENSITY FOR 
MERCANTILISM BY WORLD REGIONS 
As a combined indicator representing both state strength and the potential for state 
competition (number of states interacting in a region) the 108 measures for historical 
state strength for Afro-Eurasian countries can be divided into the eight Afro-Eurasian 
world regions of Lewis and Wigen gives the following, which can be viewed as an 
objective empirical estimate of state competition potential. 
 
Western Europe 13.9 
W Asia/N Africa  9.0 
Sub Saharan Africa 8.6 
Southeast Asia 5.4 
                                                 
14
 ‘Answers were extracted from the historical accounts on each of 119 countries in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. The scores on the three questions were multiplied by one another and by 50, so that for a 
given fifty year period, what is today a country has a score of 50 if it was an autonomous nation, 0 if it 
had no government above the tribal level, 25 if the entire territory was ruled by another country, and so 
on. We then combined the data for the 39 periods, experimenting with different ways of “discounting” 
to reduce the weight of periods in the more remote past.’ (Bockstette et. al. 2002, 346).  
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Eastern Europe 5.4 
East Asia  3.9 
Central Asia  3.8 
South Asia 3.6 
 
However, at different time periods there were greater and lesser degrees of 
interaction between world regions. The major historical divisions Lewis and Wigen 
make are first between the ‘new worlds’ and Eurasia, and within the vast Afro-
Eurasian area, between Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and the rest of Eurasia. There 
are then increasingly less important divisions between South Asia, Europe, and East 
and West Europe. With time the trade and cultural connections between East, 
Southeast, and South Asia would increase while at the same time the connections 
between East and West Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa (at times) would 
increase. If we take the varying degrees of interaction between regions into account 
(again using Lewis and Wigen, the major divisions in sociopolitical interaction were 
between East Asia, South Asia, and west-Asia/Mediterranean) we get something like 
the following:  
Sub-Saharan Africa   8.6 
East/South/ Southeast Asia 12.9 
Europe (East and West) 19.3 
Europe/+Mediterranean 24.1 
 27 
On this measurement, which combines levels of trade and historical interaction 
between regions, western Eurasia had by far the greatest potential for state 
competition and competitive policies to develop.
15
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 Sub-Saharan Africa may seem to be especially problematic. It has a vast agricultural ecumene 
comparable to that of western Eurasia (even when taking into account large areas of dominantly forest 
cover that significantly reduce agricultural land in the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa). However, 
here is a good example of where rejections of environmental influence such as those of Blaut (1993), 
Sluyter (2003) or Robbins (2003) are problematic: They often reject single factors in a piecemeal 
fashion. Yet in complex systems, of which society is a supreme example, it is widely emphasized and 
accepted that it is the interplay between factors that are often of primary importance. In Africa, the 
difficulty of the environment is reflected in the unusually low population densities of the continent 
(which preexist and are largely spatially unrelated to the slave trade – see Bairoch 1993 and Maddison 
1995 and 2001; the low population density of Africa is often unnoticed because many map projections 
obscure the vast size of Africa relative to other world regions, increasing the likelihood of failing to 
notice how relatively small African populations are given the continent’s vast size). Also, as evident in 
Figure 8.2, the water transport potential in Africa is exceptionally low; none of the great African rivers 
are easily navigable into the interior, many dropping off the great African plateaus, a fact that combines 
with the low degree of coastal indentation and few natural ports to make water transport very difficult 
in Africa (Sowell 1996, 1998; Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup 1999). Although this is frequently remarked 
upon, it is the interaction of multiple factors such as transport costs, agricultural productivity, 
demographic factors, the biogeography of disease, and state and institutional development and other 
factors that is important, a subtle and complex interrelationship that cannot be understood by looking at 
any one of the relevant factors on their own. [continued next page] 
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These measures are of course rough estimates. But they do allow for an objective 
and empirical measure, as opposed to many of the vague statements and assertions 
one finds in the historical, economic, political and development literature, of the 
degree of state competition within regions. I plan to further refine and quantify these 
empirical measurements. Overall, it seems that there was a much greater potential for 
state competition in the vast western Eurasian agricultural ecumene than in any other 
region in the world. As has been argued by so many social scientists from different 
                                                                                                                                            
Of particular relevance here, the number of historically strong states in Africa is much smaller than the 
grid of modern artificially imposed European state structure suggests. Furthermore, given their wide 
spatial separation (Stock 1995, below) and the underappreciated vastness of the Sub-Saharan region, 
they likely had significantly less interaction than states in many other Eurasian regions, and the 
Bockstette et. al. measure likely overestimates the overall level of state strength and interaction in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Major Precolonial African States and Empires 
Source: Stock 1995, p. 62 
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political and disciplinary perspectives, this seems to have been a crucial factor in 
European development. It was an impetus towards trading post and colonial 
expansion, increasing the likelihood that it would be a western Eurasian power that 
would first stumble upon the then unknown extra-Eurasian lands. This, as Blaut 1993, 
Frank 1998, Pomeranz 2000, Acemoglu et. al. 2003, 2005 and others have argued, 
had profound knock-on effects on European political, social, demographic, 
technological, and institutional development with effects that are still felt today, and 
are especially apparent in global spatial patterns of development today. 
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